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INTRODUCTION
There was a time, not long ago, when some commentators believed 
Europe was a model for the rest of the world. US sociologist 
Jeremy Rifkin forecast The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of 
the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (2004); British foreign 
policy expert Mark Leonard explained Why Europe Will Run the 
21st Century (2005); and US publicist T.R. Read boldly predicted 
The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American 
Supremacy (2004).
A decade later, it would be unthinkable for anyone to write such 
books. The global financial crisis of 2007/08 may have started in 
the US with the collapse of its subprime housing market. However, 
the crisis quickly spread to Europe, where it had far worse consequences. 
Whereas in the US, the economic crisis mainly affected individual 
companies such as the failed investment bank Lehman Brothers 
and insurance giant AIG, the economic crisis in Europe quickly 
became a crisis of sovereigns. Greece has been teetering on the brink 
of bankruptcy since late 2009. Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus 
had to be bailed out by various mechanisms. France and Italy 
hardly look reassuring, either.
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Some might argue that Europe’s recent troubles are just of a 
cyclical nature and that eventually the continent will recover. 
However, such an optimistic assessment is not warranted. What 
we are witnessing in Europe is much more fundamental. 
The current troubles of Europe are symptoms of the end of the 
European world order. To put this into perspective, we only need to 
think back to the Great War whose centenary we are commemorating.
World War I was the time when Europe last ruled the world politically 
and economically. The end of that war marked the beginning of 
the end of Europe’s global hegemony – along with a significant era 
of history.
No doubt history was made in Europe before the Great War. 
With the Age of Enlightenment, Europe led the way in scientific 
discoveries and ideas. Industrialisation catapulted Europe’s economies 
from medieval production methods to modernity within a few 
decades. The military power of European nations was unmatched. 
Many European nations, even small ones such as Belgium, 
established colonies all over the world.
On the eve of World War I, Western Europe accounted for 
one-seventh of the global population but one-third of the global 
economy. Of the ten largest economies in the world in 1913, six 
were European.1 Europe’s influence on global ideas and institutions 
was greater still, not least due to its colonial outreach.
A century ago, European capitals dominated world politics. The 
streets of London, Paris and Berlin were once the corridors of 
world power. Indeed, the monumental buildings along Whitehall, 
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the Élysée Palace and the Reichstag still exude a profound sense 
of greatness and historic significance.
In some ways, this European dominance of world affairs remains 
palpable to this day. Among the most influential newspapers and 
broadcasters are the Financial Times, The Economist and the BBC, 
all headquartered in London. Europe accounts for three of the 
UN Security Council’s five permanent, veto-power holding members –
Britain, France and Russia (not India, Brazil or Japan). Eurocentrism is 
even more pronounced in the G7, which includes Britain, Germany, 
France, Italy and the European 
Union (but not Mexico, Australia 
or China).
But these are the dying embers of 
a past world behemoth. Europe’s 
inf luence is undoubtedly in decline. Whereas in 1980, the current 
28 EU member states accounted for almost a third of the global 
economy, their share today is only 23%.2 Because of the continuing 
rise of Asian economies, this figure will further decline over the 
coming decades.
It would be easy to excuse Europe’s relative decline as a result of 
the rise of other, previously poor countries. But that would be 
dishonest. Europe’s decay is mostly due to the way Europe has been 
conducting itself.
If other countries were catching up with Europe while Europe 
itself was doing fine, that would be no reason for concern. Such 
convergence is the rightful triumph of a globalised economy.
But Europe is not doing fine.
Europe’s decay is mostly due 
to the way Europe has been 
conducting itself.
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Europe’s downfall will also show in population numbers. The UN 
estimates that by 2100, only 5.9% of the world’s population will be 
European compared to the approximately 10% now. This is not just 
a relative reduction but also an absolute decline of 104 million 
Europeans from 743 million today to just 639 million in 2100.3 
Contrast this with the only one statistic in which Europe leads 
the world by a mile: The EU’s 28 member states account for 54% 
of global spending on social welfare.4 
It would be too simplistic to reduce Europe’s 
challenges to problems with its monetary 
union. Nor is Europe’s crisis limited to countries 
like Greece that produce negative headlines 
at regular intervals.
Europe’s problems are more fundamental. Its elitist structure 
of governance has locked its political institutions into paralysis. Its 
economic model of a mixed market economy is unable to keep up 
pace with more dynamic world regions. Its demographic changes 
will test the limits of its expanding welfare state. And all of this 
is happening against a background of increased security concerns 
on Europe’s borders with Africa, the Arab world, and Russia. 
Europe is being challenged on many fronts at once, and even this is 
an understatement.
It would be optimistic to say Europe is at the crossroads today. At 
least that would suggest it has a choice between reform and decline. 
But it increasingly looks as if there is no such choice and Europe’s 
inevitable future is one of decaying power, wealth and influence. 
It would be optimistic 
to say Europe is at the 
crossroads today. 
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Europe then is not at the crossroads but is facing a dead-end. Or a 
cliff. A very steep cliff.
Europe’s leaders are struggl ing to come up with solutions 
to these challenges, preferring instead to instinctively cling to 
the EU’s mantra of “ever closer union” – as if that programmatic 
vision, spelt out in the EU Treaty, is sufficient in itself. Or as if 
“ever closer union” had been a pure success story.
This essay provides a brief historic account of Europe’s downfall 
and an analysis of Europe’s current economic and monetary crisis.
More importantly, it tries to make sense of Europe’s downfall. If 
you will, it is a eulogy written for a continent that shaped world 
history for centuries but is desperately failing to shape its own 
future. This essay does so from the perspective of a writer who 
is European himself but has chosen to observe European affairs 
from the distance of the South Pacific. As such, the account is 
coloured as much by personal affections and affiliations as by an 
emotional detachment that such geographical distance allows.
Finally, though there are elements of Europe’s decline that are 
unique to the continent, there are lessons that apply beyond Europe. 
We in Australasia could do well to learn from the pitfalls of elitist 
decision-making and an unsustainable, expanding welfare state.
To be clear, Europe is still one of the most developed, most 
prosperous, and most liveable places on earth. However, the 
cracks in Europe are clearly visible and will become increasingly 
pronounced over the coming decades. It is a world region that 
made the past but will not make the future.
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SOME REVISIONIST THOUGHTS ON EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION
The official history of European integration is easily told. The 
attempt to unite Europe came out of the experience of previous 
conflicts.
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, in which Prussia defeated 
France, not only paved the way for Germany’s first unification. It 
had also humiliated the French, who had to pay substantial war 
reparations to Germany and cede the Alsace-Lorraine territory. 
The result was deep enmity between the two countries.
After World War I, which Germany lost, France not only regained 
its lost regions but also imposed severe financial conditions on 
Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. These conditions crippled 
the German economy and ultimately led to the rise of radical 
political forces, culminating in World War II.
In both cases, the resolution of wars sowed the seeds of future 
conflict. The French longed to avenge perceived German injustices 
after 1871, and it was the other way around in 1918.
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Fortunately, there were politicians after World War II who sincerely 
believed that this vicious cycle had to be broken. They realised 
that no country should be humiliated and punished following a war 
defeat because such measures only made the next war more likely. 
Instead, European countries had to work together to ensure that 
the horrors of the two world wars were never repeated.
The best expression of this idea is the Schuman Declaration of 
1950. Issued by the French government and its foreign minister 
Robert Schuman, it stated:
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of 
creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can 
bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance 
of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 
20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France 
has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A 
united Europe was not achieved and we had war.5 
The contrast between past military conflicts on the one hand and 
European integration on the other is the founding myth of the 
EU. It is also the motif that European politicians cite whenever 
problems arise in the governance of European institutions. The 
message behind it is clear: Yes, integrating European countries is 
not without its problems. But the alternative is war.
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Over the course of European integration, leading politicians 
like German Chancellor Angela Merkel have often appealed to 
such reasoning: “No one should think that a further half century 
of peace and prosperity is assured. If the euro fails, Europe will fail.”6 
As useful as this argument may be for political rhetoric, it is 
wrong on two grounds. First, it is a non sequitur fallacy to proclaim 
that failure to integrate Europe and to drive this process to an 
eventual political and economic union would inevitably result in 
military conflict. There are many neighbouring countries in the 
world that are not integrated but do not go to war with each other. 
European integration on its own is not responsible for peace. 
Without the EU, would Germany invade Austria? Would the 
Netherlands attack Belgium? Would Sweden conquer Finland? If 
such questions appear absurd, it is because they are. To claim that 
without the EU (or even just by weakening the EU) there would be 
more conflict is rhetorical hyperbole and nothing else.
The second reason to question the EU’s founding myth is historical. 
The EU regards Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan Willem 
Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, 
Sicco Mansholt, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri 
Spaak and Altiero Spinelli as the ‘Founding Fathers of the European 
Union’. The EU says on its website that these men “were a diverse 
group of people who held the same ideals: a peaceful, united and 
prosperous Europe.”7 
People like Hallstein and Churchill may have been idealists to some 
degree. But they were also realists, pragmatists and rationalists – 
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but most importantly, they were politicians. However genuine, would 
their commitment to (post-War) peace alone have impelled them to 
build the EU?
To ask this question is to answer it. It is quite implausible that 
peace-loving idealism alone would have led to a pan-European 
integration, otherwise Eastern Europe would have initially been part 
of the EU and its predecessors. Indeed, the reason Eastern Europe 
played no role in (Western) European integration is also the real 
reason for the beginning of European integration after World 
War II.
The Soviet Union was allied with Western powers in defeating 
Nazi Germany, but parted ways soon after over the spoils of war. 
Europe was divided into two spheres of political and ideological 
influence after 1945. Democracy and capitalism were the guiding 
ideas in the Western sphere under the United States and Britain, 
while socialism and central planning ruled in the Eastern sphere 
under the Soviet Union.
The collision of these two economic and ideological spheres defined 
European politics from 1945 to 1989. It divided Germany and tore 
Europe apart.
The European Economic Community (EEC) and its predecessor, 
the European Coal and Steel Community, were founded in 1957 
and 1951, respectively. They were established against this 
background of increased confrontation between the East and 
West due to the Cold War and deepening schisms in their spheres 
of influence. Both the West and East defined their interests and 
united against each other. This was most evident militarily with 
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the West’s defence alliance NATO (founded in 1949) pitched 
against the Warsaw Pact (1955), the Soviet Union’s military bloc.
This military integration not just bound together Western European 
nations as an exercise in promoting peace but also unified the bloc 
against a common enemy from the east. More importantly, it was 
a similar project (and a precursor) to Western Europe’s economic 
integration.
Thus the great Schuman Declaration may have waxed lyrical 
about war and peace – but European integration came down to 
something as prosaic as coal and steel. What Schuman was really 
talking about was a treaty to pool coal and steel production – two 
of the most crucial industries in Europe.
Pooling Western Europe’s 
coal and steel industries 
fulfilled two purposes at 
once. Applying the lessons 
learnt from 1871 and 1918 
helped integrate the loser 
of World War II, Germany, 
instead of isolating it. It also 
gave shape to Western Europe’s bloc-building exercise directed 
against the Soviet Union to form a strong alliance in the Cold War.
More than the genuine peace rhetoric after World War II, it was 
the Cold War, an ideological fear of communism, and economic 
profiteering that spurred Western European politicians to create 
the EU. After all, the EU has always been a project with an 
More than the genuine peace rhetoric 
after World War II, it was the Cold 
War, an ideological fear of communism, 
and economic profiteering that spurred 
Western European politicians to create 
the EU.
Why Europe Failed
 
11
idealistic superstructure and a means of achieving less idealistic 
political goals. It has been a tool for overcoming nationalistic 
egotisms and a means of promoting national interests at the 
European level. It has been a framework for enabling trade between 
its members and a way of protecting one’s own industries.
The dual nature of European integration is exemplified by the 
two core nations involved in the European project: Germany 
and France. Both subscribed to the narrative of promoting the 
project of European integration. But they did so for entirely 
different reasons.
For West Germany, European integration through the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the EEC was a pathway back 
to international recognition. The total defeat of Nazi Germany 
was not just a military collapse but a moral collapse as well. By 
its war atrocities and genocide of the Jews, Germany had turned 
itself into a pariah within the community of nations. It wanted 
to re-enter the international community, 
and closer economic and political 
engagement with its neighbours offered 
just that. Germany also needed this 
international engagement to reinstate 
the sovereignty it had lost to the Allied 
Forces of World War II (and would not 
finally regain them until the so-called ‘two-plus-four’ negotiations 
preceding Germany’s reunification in 1990).
Reaching out to its former arch enemy, Germany, made sense 
for France, too. In 1952, just a year after the European Coal and 
European integration was 
thus an insurance policy for 
France against both German 
and Soviet aggression.
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Steel Community had been founded, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin 
proposed that Germany should be reunited and neutralised (the 
so-called ‘Stalin Notes’). There was a real threat of the whole of 
Germany being drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. France 
(and other Western countries) decided to counter Soviet advances 
by developing closer relations with West Germany and locking it 
into the Western sphere.
Second, spearheading the integration of Germany into Europe 
allowed France a degree of control over its former enemy. Meta-
phorically speaking, it was a close French embrace of Germany 
with the unvoiced intention of reducing the latter’s ability to move. 
This motivation was visible in the European Coal and Steel 
Community, and it reared again in France’s push for a European 
monetary union in the 1970s. The reasoning was simple: the 
more Germany was enmeshed in a European framework, the less 
it could dominate European affairs (and the greater would be 
France’s influence).8 
European integration was thus an insurance policy for France against 
both German and Soviet aggression. For Germany, European 
integration was a path back to respectability and sovereignty. But 
for either of them, it was unequivocally never solely a peace project 
(maybe not even predominantly).
None of this is to diminish the genuine efforts of European citizens 
of different countries to promote peace, reconciliation and 
international understanding. Of course, there were idealists driven 
by the desire to end war once and for all, and move towards a 
peaceful future for all of Europe. Out of this wish came countless 
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initiatives such as student exchanges, town twinnings, and cultural 
cooperation.
Indeed, the past 70 years have been (largely) a time of peace for 
Europe. With the notable exceptions of the Balkan Wars of the 
1990s and the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 
conflicts between states have not been allowed to escalate to the 
military level. The EU may claim that this is its own success, and 
it may be true to a degree. Having said that, the counterfactual is 
hard to prove. Would a Europe with NATO but without the EU 
have been less peaceful?
Regardless of whether and how much the EU can claim responsibility 
for post-War peace, there is a danger of falling prey to the European 
elite’s rhetoric of integration as a peace project, which is used as a 
justification for all sorts of polices. For example, it was used to 
introduce the euro currency and bail out individual Eurozone 
members.
Calling the EU a by-product of the Cold War is a heresy in Europe, 
where the idealism of the European project is stressed at every 
occasion. But the louder the idealism, the more suspicious the 
public ought to be. 
It is important to realise that Europe’s integration was not just a 
peace project but also an exercise in power politics and economic 
profiteering. The role of the Cold War in creating the EU will 
otherwise be all too easily forgotten.
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More importantly, accepting the real reasons behind the European 
project is essential to deal with Europe’s current crisis of existence. 
European integration was not founded solely on idealism. But the 
pretence of such idealism often makes dealing with Europe’s problems 
harder than it ought to be. If only we could discuss the euro crisis 
without having to put it in terms of war and peace, it would be 
easier to solve. Instead, European problems are addressed not in 
economic but in political terms.
It is high time to leave behind rose-tinted accounts of the history 
of European integration and approach it with a greater sense 
of realism.
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BUILDING UTOPIA: EUROPE AS AN ELITIST PROJECT
The project of European integration embodied by the EU and 
its predecessors should not be confused with lofty idealism. It 
has been power politics from the moment it started. As such, it 
was initiated by those in power – and not by the governed. The 
entire framework of European integration has always been one 
designed by Europe’s elites.
The peoples of Europe did not one day realise they wanted to be 
integrated and bound together by a supra-national organisation. The 
French, Italians or Dutch did not suddenly demand to be European 
henceforth. The Germans did not plead with their government to 
give up the Deutsche Mark and introduce the euro. There has never 
been a popular movement for any kind of European integration.
That European integration happened regardless is entirely due to the 
agenda of its political and economic elites. They convinced their 
people of the benefits of an integrated Europe – and if that was 
not enough, they were (and still are) prepared to go ahead with 
their agenda notwithstanding lack of popular support.
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Eurobarometer results show how little the European project 
resonates with ordinary Europeans. Since 1973, the European 
Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion 
in its member states. One of the regular questions is about popular 
interest in European affairs: “And as far as European politics are 
concerned, that is matters related to the European Community, 
to what extent would you say that you are interested in them?” 
Figure 1 shows that mass interest in European politics was never 
particularly high. Perhaps alarmed by the prevalence of the answer 
“Not much” when people were asked about interest in EEC 
affairs, the Eurobarometer introduced a category “To some extent” 
in the mid-1980s. But even that did not improve the results much. 
Figure 1: Eurobarometer on interest in European affairs
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“Great interest” in European affairs declined steadily. The 
predominant answers demonstrate that Europeans have had little 
interest in EEC affairs.
This lack of public interest corresponds with a lack of common 
knowledge about EU affairs. Paul Statham surveyed European 
journalists and asked them about their readers’ interests. The 
answers were unequivocal: The interest and knowledge of national 
political affairs by far exceeded the corresponding figures at the 
EU level.9
Europe was never an issue high on people’s agenda; nor was it 
something that would win the hearts and minds of ordinary 
Europeans. Most opinion polls show Europeans are lukewarm on 
European integration – not openly 
hostile, but certainly not glowing 
supporters either.
That the European integration 
project has proceeded despite 
such disinterest was only because 
European politicians kept pushing 
it – and are still pushing it.
A few examples easily demonstrate how elitist European integration 
has been. The first concerns the practice of seeking legitimacy for 
further European integration through referenda. This in itself is 
not elitist. On the contrary, it is only right and just that the peoples 
of Europe have a say in policymaking.
Europe was never an issue high 
on people’s agenda; nor was it 
something that would win the 
hearts and minds of ordinary 
Europeans. 
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However, European referenda show their elitist streak the moment 
the people of Europe do not vote as the elites would like them to 
vote. When that happens, it does not mean the end of the matter. It 
typically means the referendum is either ignored – or the people get a 
second chance to come up with a “better” or “more correct” result.10 
The first time this happened was when the Danes rejected the 
Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 referendum. Following this, the EU 
granted Denmark some concessions on the treaty, which justified 
putting an amended version to a second referendum a year 
later. This time it passed.
Ireland then rejected the Treaty of Nice in 2001 – only to be called 
back to the polls a year later. At their second chance, the Irish voted 
for the new treaty. History repeated itself when Ireland rejected the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 – only to approve it a year later on the 
second chance.
Speaking of the Treaty of Lisbon, this treaty is in effect the 
planned and failed EU Constitution by another name.11 But why 
did the Constitution fail? Because it was rejected not once but 
twice in referenda. Both France and the Netherlands threw it 
out in 2005. This should have killed the attempt to introduce the 
Constitution. Instead, the bulk of it was preserved and reintroduced 
under the Treaty of Lisbon – which, by the way, also meant that 
Britain did not hold a referendum on it. When it was still called 
the Constitution, all major British parties had pledged to put it to 
a referendum. Once it was renamed, the promise no longer applied.
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Referenda that are held again and again if the first run does not 
produce the right result are one way in which Europe’s elitist 
politicians work the system. An even more striking example are 
those referenda that are never held because politicians know they 
would fail.
The history of Europe’s major treaties, such as the treaties of 
Rome, Maastricht, Nice or Lisbon, is one of treaties rarely ever 
being put to a popular vote. In the vast majority of countries, 
treaty changes are passed only by parliaments. Though theoretically 
that lends legitimacy to those treaties, it means rather than the 
electorate it is the very same political parties, whose leaders 
negotiate the treaties at the international stage, that pass them in 
national parliaments.
An additional complication is that political parties in some EU 
member states form a de facto cartel on EU matters. In the German 
Bundestag, for example, there is practically no opposition to 
fundamental EU matters (with the exception of a smallish 
post-communist party, The Left), while all other parties across 
the political spectrum support not just the EU project but also 
further integration. Political respectability, at least in Germany, 
required a subscription to the European integration consensus view. 
Questioning integration could turn any political party into a pariah. 
This means even if the public feels uneasy about EU affairs (or 
maybe is just not interested in them), such popular scepticism is 
not represented in parliament by their representatives.
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Of course, politicians are only too aware of those areas of 
European integration that would never stand a chance of being 
implemented if the people were asked. Former German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, for example, has been very explicit in a number 
of interviews that he did not put the introduction of the euro 
currency to a popular vote because he knew it would have failed:
I knew that I could never win a referendum in Germany. We 
would have lost a referendum on the introduction of the euro. 
That’s quite clear. I would have lost and by seven to three … 
If a Chancellor is trying to push something through, he must 
be a man of power. And if he’s smart, he knows when the 
time is ripe. In one case – the euro – I was like a dictator.12 
If one were generous, one might call such behaviour political 
leadership. However, one might also be astounded by how a head of a 
democratically elected government knowingly put his own (elitist) 
views above the views of the vast majority of people.
Europe’s elites, of course, would never accept the accusation of 
European elitism. They would rather maintain that Europe is a 
thoroughly democratic project – and to underline this assertion, 
they would point to the European Parliament, the parliament 
with second-largest electorate in the world (after India).
The European Parliament itself is not without its problems, 
though. Well, actually there are three. First, it is not a real parliament. 
Second, its democratic legitimacy evaporates a little bit more with 
each election. And third, the common European hardly takes any 
notice of it.
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Maybe because of the 
European Parliament’s 
lack of power, few 
Europeans bother to 
vote in European elections...
The first problem is the most basic one: Unlike national parliaments, 
the European Parliament does not have the right to initiate 
lawmaking procedures. This is not a triviality. Parliaments are often 
called legislatures because that is what they are there for: to legislate. 
The European Parliament can neither make laws on its own (it needs 
the European Commission, i.e. the executive branch of the EU, to do 
that), nor easily remove the executive (it needs a two-thirds majority). 
In effect, the European Parliament hardly deserves its name. It is a 
toothless parliament by the standards of most democratic nations.
Maybe because of the European Parliament’s 
lack of power, few Europeans bother to vote 
in European elections – the second problem 
with European democracy. Since the first 
election to the European Parliament in 1979, 
voter turnout has decreased with every single 
election: from 63% in 1979 to just 42.5% in 2014.
The third problem with the European Parliament is loosely 
connected to the previous two: Europeans only really take notice 
of the European Parliament when it is elected every five years. And 
even then, turnout is low, and national rather than pan-European 
political topics dominate the election campaign. In between elections, 
the European Parliament hardly ever features in the media. It is 
no exaggeration to say that the vast majority of Europeans do 
not follow a single debate in the European Parliament in any given 
year. It is thus a Parliament that meets in splendid isolation from 
its voters – not entirely without function, admittedly, but almost 
entirely without a democratic audience. This is problematic not least 
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because the European Parliament plays a crucial role in making 
laws affecting the entire EU – laws that may be highly unpopular 
if discussed at the national level. Once passed at the EU level, 
however, laws become binding, leaving little discretion for 
nation-states to deviate from them.
Despite its limited rights, low electoral turnout, and limited public 
reach, the European Parliament does not make the EU any less of 
an elitist project. On the contrary, EU parliamentarians are very 
much part of the EU elite.
From a democratic perspective, the state of European affairs is 
so dismal that it is often quipped that any country configured like 
the EU would struggle to be admitted into the EU. It would simply 
not be democratic enough to be worthy of accession.
Though this sounds like a harsh judgment, it is nevertheless true. 
EU affairs are and have always been deeply anti-democratic. It is 
a European elite that determines the course of European politics. 
This author has made his own experiences with what happens 
when the EU elite’s view gets challenged (see Appendix 1).
In contrast, the will of the people does not matter. But then 
again, there is not a European people anyway but only European 
peoples – but that is a different problem altogether.
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NO PEOPLE, NO COUNTRY
Of course there are some good things to be said about the EU. The 
common market is its greatest achievement. The four freedoms – the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital – have been 
almost fully realised. Great strides too have been made in unifying 
European markets, increasing competition, reducing transaction 
costs, and maximising consumer welfare.
The Schengen Agreement is another milestone for European 
integration. Being able to freely cross borders without controls 
from the North Cape to Sicily and from Lisbon to Warsaw has 
made travelling a remarkable experience. So much so that one 
forgets this was once a continent defined by borders that were often 
disputed, heavily controlled, and sometimes difficult to cross. 
And of course, with the caveats mentioned above, one could 
argue that the EU has made a contribution towards a more peaceful 
European order.
Despite such achievements, the EU’s structural design flaws are at 
least in part responsible for some of the problems facing the union. 
The most fundamental is related to the lack of a European people.
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What the EU seeks to achieve, it mainly does because it suits the 
interests of its individual member states but within the structure 
and institutions of a nation-state.
There is an executive government in the form of the European 
Commission. There is a legislature in the form of the European 
Parliament (deficient as it is), and there is a judiciary in the form 
of European courts in lieu of high courts or supreme courts.
There is only one problem with this. The institutions of a nation-state 
first and foremost require a nation. And for a true democracy to 
work, it needs a demos – a people. 
The EU does not have a people. 
No one self-identifies as purely or 
even mainly European (with the 
possible exception of the Germans 
still too ashamed to be German). Instead, the majority of Europeans 
self-identify as Czechs, French, Swedes or Italians, Maltese, Spanish 
and so on.
Today, the 28 EU member states range from the tiny states of 
Luxembourg and Malta to industrial heavyweights like Germany and 
Italy, from formerly communist economies in Eastern Europe to 
the self-styled postmodern service economy of the United Kingdom.
The EU includes countries that are predominantly Protestant 
like Sweden and Catholic countries like Poland, as well as mainly 
atheist countries like the Czech Republic. It includes countries that 
have a civil law tradition like France and common law countries 
like Ireland. It includes countries with traditionally good fiscal 
discipline like Denmark and countries with large debt burdens 
like Greece.
The institutions of a nation-state 
first and foremost require a nation.
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In other words, the current EU is an assortment of 28 extremely 
diverse countries united under one banner. But the umbrella of 
EU membership has not eradicated the national peculiarities at all.
Least of all, the European project and the elites that have promoted 
it have not managed to form a European people, a demos, out of 
the many different nationalities. There is not even a pan-European 
identity to replace the national identities. But without a demos, can 
there ever be a true democracy?
Mark Steyn, the Canadian writer and commentator, summed 
up Europe’s troubles when he said the core problem was that 
it was impossible to convince the Swedes that the Greeks were 
not foreigners to them, and vice versa. Though this may sounds 
flippant, it is indeed the fundamental problem.
Making the EU work requires overcoming the national and 
cultural differences within the continent. Desirable or not, 
for all practical purposes this task is impossible given Europe’s 
extreme diversity.
EU structures are mimicking the workings of nation-states because 
the EU aspires to become supra-nation-state under its ultimate goal 
of “ever closer union”. It is just not obvious how a single European 
people can ever be formed out of Europe’s peoples.
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PANEM ET CIRCENSES: THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN 
WELFARE STATE
The anti-democratic political structures of European integration 
should have made the European project unpopular. Similarly, 
the declining relative importance of Europe should have been a 
concern for Europe’s citizens. And if none of that bothered the 
Europeans, then maybe the slowing economic dynamism 
should have.
Yet despite such shortcomings, there have not been uprisings 
against (Western) Europe’s status quo since World War II. European 
citizens witnessed falling average growth rates decade after decade. 
They saw mass unemployment become a persistent feature of 
their society. They also realised how their economies lost entire 
industries to newly developing countries. Despite this, there has 
been remarkable political stability for decades across the EU.
This is of course not to say that there have never been any changes 
of government, which sometimes even brought about some policy 
changes. However, the basic direction has remained the same. 
At least Western Europe countries were typically governed by 
Why Europe Failed
 
29
parties that subscribed to a mixed economy model and continued 
with European integration through the EU and its predecessors. 
Whether governments were led by centre-left or centre-right parties 
or coalitions became a matter of aesthetic preference. It rarely 
ever mattered much beyond that.
Government spending as a percentage of GDP increased dramatically 
across Europe all through the 20th century (Table 1).
Table 1: Change in government spending as a percentage of GDP13 
The pattern of government growth is also similar across Europe. 
Both world wars increased government spending (except in Spain, 
which remained neutral in World War I and thus did not have to 
increase its expenditure). Since the immediate post-World War II 
and reconstruction era, government spending has increased to 
unprecedented levels. The most extreme case is France where the 
state now accounts for well over half of the economy.
Country Pre WWI 
(1913)
Post WWI 
(1920)
Pre WWII 
(1937)
1960 1990 2013
France 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 49.8 57.1
Germany 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 45.1 44.3
Italy 17.1 30.1 31.1 30.1 53.4 50.5
UK 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 39.9 46.9
Belgium 13.8 22.1 21.8 30.3 54.3 54.7
Netherlands 9.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 54.1 49.8
Spain 11.0 8.3 13.2 18.8 50.1 44.3
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These spending rises have not been driven by the core areas of 
government spending of law and order, defence and certain public 
goods. Instead, all the increases in government spending have 
been in education, health and welfare.
In a 2014 paper for the Centre for Policy Studies, economist Brian 
Sturgess analysed data for 19 European OECD countries for 15 
years from 1996 to 2011. He found that on average, European 
governments now direct only 19% of their total spending to core 
responsibilities, while 10% is spent on subsidies and infrastructure, 
12% on education, 15% on health, and 38% on social security.14 
On average, these European countries spent almost 30% of GDP 
on welfare alone, which is more than the total of government 
spending before World War II.
There are many possible explanations for this growth of government. 
American economist Robert Higgs describes a ratchet effect 
in his book Crisis and Leviathan. In times of real or imagined 
national emergencies, mainly wars and recessions, government 
takes over previously private rights and activities. When the crisis 
passes, government retreats somewhat, but never to the same level as 
before.15 This ratchet effect could indeed explain why European 
governments increased in size during the two world wars. However, 
it is less well suited to explain the additional (and substantial) 
government growth since 1945.
Another explanation is the rise of Keynesian economics after 
World War II. Keynesian demand-side management had given 
governments a licence to increase spending to ‘stimulate’ the 
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economy. This probably contributed somewhat to the growth of 
government. However, not every European country subscribed to 
Keynesian policies. Germany, for example, only briefly flirted with 
Keynesianism in the late 1960s and 1970s, and yet its spending 
record was similar to that of countries where Keynesianism 
was stronger.
The theory of public choice explains this growth in government 
spending as a consequence of lobby activities and rent seeking. 
Public choice undoubtedly has strong explanatory power – but 
it still does not explain why European governments grew much 
faster than their counterparts in other developed economies such 
as the US, Australia or New Zealand.
Perhaps the burgeoning size of government in Europe has 
something to do with the specific political structure of the EU. 
Though this argument might be hard to prove empirically, there 
is some value to it. In building the unpopular political superstructure 
of the EU, the European elites had to ensure the electorate would 
not desert them. They achieved this by establishing a welfare 
state that went far beyond a mere safety net. Instead, European 
welfare states became an al l-encompassing insurance and 
entertainment scheme.
Seen this way, the European welfare state was a means of buying 
the public’s silence and acquiescence. It was the same method of 
securing power Juvenal described in his Satires two millennia ago:
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Already long ago, from when we sold our vote to no man, 
the People have abdicated our duties; for the People who once 
upon a time handed out military command, high civil office, 
legions — everything, now restrains itself and anxiously 
hopes for just two things: bread and circuses.
Bread and circuses – or panem et circenses in the Latin original – 
were the means of bribing the masses in ancient Rome. Modern 
Europe is witnessing a similar phenomenon. To their subservient 
citizens, the European elites provide free or heavily subsidised 
education, health care, TV and radio programmes, roads, income 
support and pensions, public transport, libraries, opera houses, 
and theatres.
Unfortunately, it is often overlooked that government can only 
bribe the people with their own money. In the words of the great 
French economist Frédéric Bastiat: “Government is the great fiction 
through which everybody endeavours to live at the expense of 
everybody else.”
As a result, the very people benefiting from the welfare state are 
also footing the bill – at an astonishing cost. Last year, the 
German Federation of Taxpayers calculated the difference between 
gross wages and net take-home pay based on OECD data. To do 
this, they also included the effect of value added taxes, which are 
often hidden from view.16 
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For a single income earner on the national average income, Belgium 
topped the list of predatory governments with a tax burden of 
59.1%, followed by Hungary (54%) and Germany (53.1%). In 
most large European economies, the burden was well above 40%.
The respective tax burdens for families with two income earners 
and two children are somewhat lower, but tax burdens in Europe 
still range from 47% in Greece to 29.4% in the UK. By comparison, 
the figures for Australia and New Zealand 23.2% and 15.5%, 
respectively.
Buying European citizens’ loyalty for their mixed economy welfare 
states has effectively enslaved them. Is that the price of peace the 
EU claims it has brought to the continent? Has Europe lost its 
economic liberty as the price of national safety?
The welfare state (broadly defined as all government spending 
outside the state’s core functions) was the means by which 
Europe bought itself political stability. Little wonder, then, that 
the moment governments could no longer afford to pay for it, 
the previous political consensus started falling apart. This also 
explains the rise of radical parties such as SYRIZA in Greece, the 
National Front in France, and Podemos in Spain.
The rise of the European welfare state, the reduction of economic 
dynamism, and the increasingly questionable legitimacy of the 
European project go hand in hand. Panem et circenses could have 
been the motto of Europe’s post-World War II mixed economy 
model. It remains to be seen whether the EU will also share the 
Roman Empire’s fate.
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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB
Europe’s political and economic problems will soon be exacerbated 
by its ageing society. In a number of European countries, birth 
rates have been very low for several decades. The replacement 
fertility rate, that is, the fertility rate at which populations would 
remain constant over time, is 2.1. That means if women have, on 
average, 2.1 children over their lifetime, then every generation 
would be replaced by a new generation of the same size.
The current average fertility rate for the EU, however, stands at 
just 1.58.  This means the next generation will be about a quarter 
smaller than the current generation. If the trend continues, this 
new generation will be succeeded by another generation that is 
another 25% smaller.
Combine this drop in fertility with improvements in life expectancy 
and the result is a rapidly ageing society. The current median age 
of 45 years in Germany and Italy will reach 50 years by the middle 
of the century. At the same time, working age populations will 
collapse. Over the next four decades, Germany will lose about a 
third of its working age population. These trends are present in 
varying degrees in most European countries.
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An older population not only means more pensioners but also 
rapidly increasing health costs. Given the already precarious state 
of public finances across Europe, the continent will struggle to 
shoulder these burdens. Population ageing and shrinking will also 
mean that Europe can expect subdued economic growth rates for 
decades to come.
Some experts argue that immigration could be used to correct this 
demographic imbalance. Unfortunately, the scale of the problem 
is far too great for migration to fix. Just to maintain its current 
workforce-to-retiree ratio, Europe would need an inf lux of 
migrants several times above its current intake. Such an unprecedented 
increase is not politically viable, though. Immigration is already one 
of the most contentious issues in European politics – not least 
because Europe has never been particularly good at attracting skilled 
migrants, let alone integrating those migrants it got. 
Population ageing and shrinking as well as falling fertility rates 
are problems in most European countries. Why the fertility rate 
collapsed as much as it has is a matter for debate. Cultural pessimists 
like Theodore Dalrymple argue that modern European society 
values its material standard of living more highly than anything 
else. Children are only “obstructions to the enjoyment of life, a 
drain on resources, an obstacle to next year’s holiday in Bali or 
wherever it might be”, he writes in his book The New Vichy Syndrome.
But whatever its reasons, the main problem with demographic 
change is its sluggish nature. A development that has been going in 
the wrong direction for 25 years takes 75 years to correct. There is 
no quick fix for demographic faults; the skid marks of demographic 
change are too deep and too long.
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Even if Europe somehow managed to improve the situation of its 
younger generation and boost fertility rates to more sustainable 
levels, it cannot hold off the process of ageing and shrinking for a 
few more decades. The potential mothers to give birth to a new and 
stronger generation of Europeans have not been born themselves.
The consequences of these demographic changes will be severe. 
It will be difficult for European nations to service their debt, let 
alone repay it, with both shrinking and ageing populations. There 
is only so much that increased productivity can do to compensate 
for a collapsing workforce.
And then there is the psychological effect. Older societies may be 
more peaceful than younger ones. But they are also less creative, 
less dynamic, and more risk averse. Europe will possibly become 
a less entrepreneurial place in the future. When more than half 
the population is over the age of 50, how likely is it that the next 
big technological innovation will emerge in such a social climate?
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THE EURO FALLACY
A discussion of Europe’s problems would not be complete without 
a look at the failings of Europe’s monetary union. When we talk 
about the euro crisis today, we immediately think of Greece, 
which has been on the brink of default since late 2009. However, 
the euro crisis is not just a crisis of Greece.
In Europe’s monetary union are all the hallmarks of Europe’s 
integration failings. Monetary union was a project designed by 
Europe’s elites against the wishes of their peoples. It was a 
political power play designed to weaken Germany (only to see it 
strengthened). Finally, it was an undertaking that has damaged 
Europe’s economy and competitiveness.
To understand how Europe’s monetary union happened, it is worth-
while to remember what Europe looked like before the introduction 
of the euro. There had always been structural differences between 
Europe’s economies. Before the euro, such differences in 
competitiveness were reflected in long-term adjustments in exchange 
rates. However, such devaluations were considered a sign of weakness 
and a national embarrassment, and were unpopular in the countries 
that had to devalue.
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Consider this: In the 35 years before the introduction of the euro, 
all major European currencies progressively lost value against the 
Deutsche Mark. In 1963, DM81.36 could buy 100 French francs 
compared to only DM29.82 on the eve of the euro’s introduction 
on 1 January 1999 – a devaluation of 63.3%.
It was even more extreme for the Italian lira. In 1963, 1,000 lire 
cost DM6.41 compared to only DM1.01 in 1998 – in other words, 
the lira had lost 84.2% of its value against the Deutsche Mark.
Similar developments occurred against the Greek drachma, 
the Portuguese escudo, the Spanish peseta, and other currencies.
The massive devaluations of other 
currencies against the German Mark 
indicate the very tight monetary policy 
of the old German Bundesbank and 
the high competitiveness and productivity 
of the German economy compared to the rest of Europe.
European economies like Italy, Spain and France thus regularly 
devalued their currency to remain competitive with Germany. It 
was humiliating for the French, the Spanish and the Italians – the 
very reason they had pushed Germany into monetary union back-
fired spectacularly on them.
Germany had resisted monetary union since it was first proposed 
in the 1970s. However, it needed the support of its neighbours 
for its reunification project after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, and France used this leverage to push Germany to relinquish 
the Deutsche Mark and adopt the euro.
If the monetary union did 
not work well before the euro 
crisis, it is even worse now.
The New Zealand Initiative
 
 40
Germany’s unification was a diplomatic balancing act, which played 
out in the ‘two-plus-four’ negotiations (between the two German 
states and the four allied forces – Britain, France, the Soviet Union 
and the US) that paved the way for Germany’s reunification in 
October 1990.
It was difficult to reunite Germany – not least because the British 
and the French had to be reassured that they had nothing to fear 
from this new and bigger country in the heart of Europe.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was horrified at the 
prospect of a united Germany. “We beat the Germans twice, and 
now they’re back,” she allegedly told a meeting of European leaders 
at the time.19
Thatcher even invited historians to a seminar at Chequers to discuss 
how dangerous the Germans really were. Her trade minister, 
Nicholas Ridley, was forced to resign after he compared German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Adolf Hitler in an interview with 
The Spectator.
French suspicions of the rise of a new evil German superstate 
were equally strong, as previously confidential memos released 
by the British Foreign Office reveal. President François Mitterrand 
was convinced that the prospect of unification had turned the 
Germans into the ‘bad Germans’ they used to be. He saw them 
as behaving brutally in pursuit of their new national interests, 
thereby upsetting the political and security settings of Europe. 
In a conversation with then US President George H.W. Bush, 
Mitterrand remarked, “I like Germany so much I think there 
should be two of them!”
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Tensions were deep between Germany and its neighbours 
around the time of reunification. Even the Soviet Union was 
more open to the idea than West Germany’s old allies. France 
especially needed to be convinced that it had nothing to fear 
from a reunited Germany.
There had always been rumours that in the ‘two-plus-four’ 
negotiations, the French had demanded Germany to give up its 
beloved Deutsche Mark in return for a French ‘oui’ on reunification. 
More than once, the dominance of the über-solid Deutsche Mark 
had caused the French and other European nations pain. Forcing 
the Germans to abandon their currency was thus an appropriate 
way to weaken them so they could not become a threat to other 
nations, the French probably thought.
Then World Bank President Robert Zoellick, who was the US lead 
negotiator in the ‘two-plus-four’ negotiations, confirmed in 2011 
that France had demanded the Germans sacrifice the Deutsche 
Mark. According to Zoellick, the euro currency is a by-product 
of German reunification and was meant to calm Mitterrand’s fears 
of an all-too-powerful Germany.20 
The great historical irony of this story is, of course, that if the 
French had really planned to weaken the powers of the newly 
reunited Germany through monetary union, the plan completely 
backfired. In strategic terms, Germany’s influence has never been 
greater. With the continent relying on Germany’s AAA rating, 
Berlin can now effectively dictate fiscal policy to Athens, Lisbon 
and Rome – perhaps in the future to Paris, too. This was most 
definitely not what Mitterrand had planned.
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Perhaps an even greater irony is that the Germans are not at all 
happy with their new hegemonic power within Europe. As opinion 
polls show, they have not the slightest interest in ruling the 
European periphery. In fact, the Germans would be content being 
just a bigger version of Switzerland – prosperous, a bit boring, 
and vigorously unengaged in international affairs. It is the very 
role the West Germans learnt to play to perfection between 1945 
and 1990. This also means France and Britain had nothing to fear 
from the Germans at the time of reunification. If they had known 
the post-war Germans better, they would have been more relaxed 
about a larger Germany.
As it turns out, the euro started as a French insurance policy 
against German power. But even as an insurance policy it has 
failed. Instead, it has turned the Germans against their will into 
the new rulers of Europe. And it has consigned France to be the 
weaker partner in the Franco-German relationship.
European monetary union thus has a colourful political history 
but it has failed to weaken Germany’s economic inf luence. 
Unfortunately, that is not the euro’s only failure – far from it.
The euro crisis is now more than five years old. It was in late 2009 
when then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou admitted 
that his country had a fiscal problem. Many now see this as the 
beginning of the euro crisis.
The truth is the crisis started much earlier – namely on the day 
the euro was introduced, first as an electronic currency in 1999 
and then as coins and paper in 2002.
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To see why the euro was in crisis even then, when many politicians 
still claim that all was well before the global financial crisis, one needs 
to look behind the façade of monetary union. It is true that before 
2009, few people spoke of a euro crisis, yields on government debt 
were low, and the exchange rate of the euro was by and large stable. 
But beneath this seeming stability, something was clearly wrong in 
European monetary and economic affairs.
The first problem was the divergence in competitiveness, which 
started immediately after the euro was introduced. Where previously 
such competitiveness differences would have resulted in exchange 
rate adjustments, they now resulted in diverging unit labour costs. 
Put simply, German products became cheaper on the world 
market, whereas, say, Italian or Portuguese products became 
more expensive.
The introduction of the euro had kept a lid on wage increases 
across the German economy because Germany had entered the 
EU with a too high exchange rate. This led to high unemployment 
in Germany, followed by dramatic economic reforms, especially 
of its labour market, and a policy of wage restraint. Both the 
wage restraint and economic reforms were painful, but combined 
they ensured Germany became more and more productive and 
competitive over time. Unit labour costs fell substantially in Germany.
Meanwhile, the southern European economies, who had entered 
monetary union with the competitive advantage of low exchange 
rates, enjoyed a sudden economic boom made possible by lower 
interest rates than they had previously known.
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However, the chronic inability of southern European countries 
to implement the kind of tough economic reforms Germany had 
meant that countries such Greece, Spain and Portugal slipped 
further down the European competitiveness ladder. Their products 
became more expensive, and their governments more indebted. 
The consequences were substantial deficits in the current account 
and high unemployment in countries with excessive wage increases.
But these competitiveness developments were not the only thing 
wrong with the euro. The euro’s official interest rate reflected 
the circumstances of a struggling Germany but not the boom in 
periphery countries.
The unrestrained building boom in Spain and Ireland was bound 
to end in a fiasco. The collapse of the construction sector not 
only triggered a rapid rise in unemployment but also plunged 
the banking sector, faced with huge write-offs on related real 
estate lending, into a deep crisis – with devastating effects on 
the fiscal situation.
Finally, the euro also failed to impose fiscal discipline on its 
member countries, so nobody played by the rules that were supposed 
to govern the monetary union. No country was supposed to enter 
the EU with debts of more than 60% of GDP – yet Belgium, Italy 
and Greece did. No EU country was supposed to run deficits higher 
than 3% of GDP – yet France and Germany did in 2003/04 
without being punished.
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The political independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
was also damaged right from the start. Its first president, Wim 
Duisenberg from the Netherlands, had been elected for a full 
eight-year term. However, political pressure from the French 
government forced him to resign his position after four years to 
allow his colleague Jean-Claude Trichet to take over.
Take these three issues together – diverging competitiveness, 
property bubbles in the periphery, and a misgoverned Eurozone – 
and it is clear the EU was dysfunctional much before the global 
financial crisis. In fact, the crisis acted as a catalyst to alert markets 
to rethink risk – and when they took a closer look at Europe they 
realised the mess it was in.
If the monetary union did not work well before the euro crisis, it 
is even worse now.
Since the euro crisis erupted around 2009/10, Europe has witnessed 
years of bungled crisis management, explicit and covert bailouts, 
and imposed austerity budgets to enforce ‘internal devaluation’. 
None of these have managed to end the crisis.
The only thing that has slowed down somewhat is the acute market 
panic over Europe – but only because markets have become used to 
a constant flow of bad news from Europe. Europe’s crisis is the new 
normal, and everybody seems to be accepting it. At least, European 
policymakers are doing so by proclaiming current policies to be 
“without alternative”.
The New Zealand Initiative
 
 46
It was a mistake to introduce the euro before Europe was ready 
for it. But it is an even bigger mistake to pretend that this badly 
designed monetary union must be defended at all cost. It would 
be far better for the Europeans to cut their losses and give up on 
the euro.
If Europe continues with its current policies, the result will be 
disastrous for everyone involved. Forcing crisis countries to continue 
devaluing internally by cutting wages, pensions and prices will 
increase their already high unemployment rates. It will condemn 
their young generations to misery and destabilise their political 
systems – and there is no guarantee that this recipe would ultimately 
improve their economic fortunes and make their products 
competitive internationally. Meanwhile, the financial commitments 
of those countries underwriting the bailout guarantees will eventually 
exceed their ability, let alone their willingness, to pay for their 
neighbours’ economic mismanagement.
Of course, any exit path from the monetary union will be 
painful for all. But at least there will be hope that once Europe’s 
countries return to currencies suited to their respective economy, 
they would be able to generate growth and employment. Breaking 
up the Eurozone would also help deal with the persistent trade 
imbalances in Europe, help crisis countries to export more, and 
make stronger economies such as Germany import more. It would 
also create a badly needed mechanism of exchange rate flexibility 
between European countries.
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Although the end of the euro’s reign and a return to national 
currencies may be good economics, it is highly unlikely to happen. 
Europe’s leaders would lose face if, after decades of propagating 
the benefits of monetary union, they allowed a new monetary 
diversity of Europe – as desirable as it may be.
So what’s going to happen next? Is there another solution at all?
Unfortunately, there is no positive solution in sight. Most likely, 
the ECB will inflate the problems away.
The ECB has been intervening in bond markets since the beginning 
of the euro crisis, and even more so with its ‘quantitative easing’ 
programme in early 2015. It is no doubt due to such interventions 
that the euro is still alive.
This is an utterly absurd situation. Bailing out other countries 
(and their banks), pooling Europe’s sovereign debt, or issuing 
Eurobonds may be incompatible with the German Constitution. 
Such tactics may well violate EU treaty law. They lack any 
meaningful democratic legitimacy. They are certainly unpopular in 
those countries most likely to foot the bill.
In theory, such measures should be impossible to implement.
But disguised as monetary policy, these quintessentially fiscal 
arrangements not only become possible, but they almost look legal. 
Simply claiming that the monetary transmission mechanism is 
broken is used as sufficient justification to save the whole of Europe 
from bankruptcy.
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Even better is that while fiscal measures are necessarily limited to 
the funds countries can raise in taxes or through running deficits, 
monetary interventions in a fiat money world have no such limitations. 
They can run for as long as tree trunks can be turned into paper 
money or zeros added to electronic accounts.
But perhaps the biggest ‘advantage’ of Europe’s current malaise 
is that not a single national parliament needs to be consulted before 
the ECB finally opens the floodgates. No European government 
needs to be involved in the process, and even if opposed to the 
measures, parliaments and governments have no realistic chance 
of stopping them.
Of course there is a lot to be said for central bank independence. 
In the case of the ECB, however, one may well wonder whether 
its actions are still covered by its independence in monetary affairs 
or, indeed, whether the ECB has moved into the terrain of fiscal 
policy for which it is not responsible.
The way Europe is dealing with the crisis of its monetary union 
is exactly the way it has always dealt with its challenges: in the 
most undemocratic way imaginable (see also Appendix 2 for an 
account of the international crisis management around Greece 
since 2010).
Whether this will be enough to save the euro in the long run 
is nevertheless a different question. It is often said that if something 
cannot go on forever, it will stop. The euro is such a thing. It cannot 
go on forever, and so it will eventually fail. In fact, it would and 
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should have failed already because of its inherent weaknesses. The 
only reason it is still with us is the political support it still enjoys. 
But even such political support may turn out to be a weak life 
insurance.
The New Zealand Initiative
 
 50
EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND
This essay was meant to draw a rough sketch of Europe’s current 
problems and put the grand European integration experiment 
into its historical context. In doing so, it discussed the result of a 
power play in European politics that started during the Cold War 
and embraced Germany to control it.
But the European integration project always suffered from an 
inherent flaw. There never was a European demos to drive the 
political and economic integration. European integration has always 
been a top-down, elite driven project. National interests have not 
been superseded by a European vision. On the contrary, national 
interests and egotisms are still alive in Europe. Though this 
integration project has never been too popular with ordinary 
voters, any dissent has been sedated by the stunning growth of 
the welfare state.
Despite these shortcomings, the EU has achievements to be 
proud of. The biggest one is the creation of a common market in 
which people, goods, capital and services can cross borders easily. 
The Schengen Agreement allowing for passport-free travel across 
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the continent is another success. A once war-torn continent has 
been politically stable and strife free for 70 years.
But Europe is also battling socio-economic realities on many 
fronts. Its governments are heavily indebted, and its populations 
are ageing and shrinking. The euro crisis has brought many of 
Europe’s previously hidden economic problems to the fore.
For us in this part of the world, the tyranny of distance from Europe 
has finally turned into a blessing. Now we have to make sure we 
do not repeat Europe’s mistakes. But what are those European 
mistakes that can be avoided in New Zealand? And what are the 
lessons we can learn from Europe’s integration disaster?
Fortunately, there are some elements of the European experience 
that will never have an equivalent in a 
New Zealand context. New Zealand’s 
geographic isolation means it will not 
enter into any arrangements that will 
undermine its sovereignty and democracy
as a nation-state. The only exception is 
its special relationship with Australia, 
which has become more integrated over 
the past three decades of Closer Economic 
Relations. But even in New Zealand’s relationship with Australia, 
integration is unlikely ever to pass the threshold of shared political 
institutions or monetary union (even though it used to be discussed 
in the past).
Seen from the outside, the 
degree to which European 
affairs are not controlled by 
the peoples of Europe but 
by a narrow political elite 
is shocking. 
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New Zealand should nevertheless pay close attention to two 
aspects of the developments in Europe. First, the way in which 
elites have captured the political decision-making process should 
be avoided here. Second, the rise of the European welfare state is 
a cautionary example.
Seen from the outside, the degree to which European affairs are 
not controlled by the peoples of Europe but by a narrow political 
elite is shocking. European voters are not presented with a clear 
choice on the course of European integration.
One should be careful not to equate democracy with good governance, 
the rule of law, or even individual liberty. Having said that, a 
well-functioning democracy can support all of these goals. Europe’s 
democracy, however, can only be called deficient. European 
integration meant that an extra level of decision-making has been 
placed between Europe’s citizens and their leaders. Ordinary 
Europeans are far removed from the most important decisions 
affecting their continent. They have no direct or meaningful say 
on issues such as Europe’s monetary union, agricultural policy, 
or foreign relations. There are simply no elections that would be 
fought over such issues.
New Zealand would do well to avoid letting its political elites 
from becoming as distant from voters. In a small country such as 
ours, this temptation may be easier to resist than in a densely populated 
continent such as Europe. But it is not just size that matters but 
attitude. Europe’s leaders have shown an elitist streak that we 
should never let any politician get away with in New Zealand. 
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The more we can strengthen the connection between citizens and their 
representatives, or rather citizens and political decision-making, the 
better. This means more elements of direct democracy and greater 
devolution of political power to the community and local government. 
Seen in this light, the creation of the Auckland super city and 
further attempts to amalgamate councils are all steps in the 
wrong direction. They remove government from the people it is 
supposed to serve. Europe’s first lesson is to distrust the distant 
political elites.
The second lesson is to be watchful of the rise of the welfare state. 
In Europe, the welfare state was a means of buying political power. 
Of course, the bribed electorate always paid for its own bribes. 
However, the arrangement worked for as long as new spending 
commitments could be financed through higher taxes, more debt, 
or indeed a combination of both. As government spending has 
now reached around 50% of GDP, and as the debt load stands 
at worrying levels, the European welfare state model has reached 
its limits. Europe’s demographic change will make it even harder 
to maintain the welfare state in the future.
New Zealand needs to avoid a replay of this ‘welfare state and 
debt’ disaster. Fortunately, our own spending and debt levels are 
substantially below Europe’s. But our society will age too, and 
there is always a temptation for politicians to buy their way to 
power through the welfare state. Europe shows where such policies 
can lead to.
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In their report Guarding the Public Purse, Bryce Wilkinson and 
Khyaati Acharya have shown how demographic change will 
affect New Zealand’s public finances over the coming decades. 
One of their observations was that under current policies, 
government spending on social welfare, including health and 
education, was projected to rise from 24.6% to 28.2% of GDP 
between 2011 and 2061, due to ageing alone.21 This would move 
New Zealand to levels currently experienced in Europe.
In New Zealand we have the luxury of being three or four decades 
behind Europe’s demography curve. But this does not have to 
mean that we will be experiencing Europe’s problems 30 or 40 
years later. It should mean that we have 30 or 40 years of finding 
ways to prevent a European replay by finding different answers to 
the challenges facing Europe today.
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CONCLUSION
The standout reasons for Europe’s decline are its elitist political 
system and its inflated welfare state – and the interrelations between 
these two.
Europe no longer rules the world. Nor can it hope to regain the 
dominant position it once enjoyed. Europe’s decline is entirely 
self-inflicted. It is a continent that first destroyed itself in two 
world wars. It then weakened itself by inflating the activities of 
the state while creating a bureaucratic, isolated, and el it ist 
superstructure in the form of the EU. It also wrecked its monetary 
system by introducing a common currency that was never going 
to work and caused more problems than it ever solved.
In many ways, Europe is a case study in how not to conduct one’s 
economic and political affairs, which makes it all the more worth-
while to pay attention to European affairs so we do not repeat 
their mistakes here. But don’t hold your breath. Short-term political 
gains through welfare spending is too tempting for politicians 
anywhere and too beguiling for voters.
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PAYING DEARLY FOR EUROPEAN INSANITY
Europe’s political elites are gathered in Brussels today for yet another 
emergency summit on the euro currency. For this column it would 
be tempting to seize the moment and rehash all the arguments for 
why the euro will never work and cannot be saved.
But after almost two years of the euro crisis, even I am getting 
tired of this exercise. And in a way, at least outside EU circles, 
everybody knows why the common currency is doomed. So 
instead let me ref lect on the underlying psychological f laws of 
European policymaking.
Einstein once defined insanity as, “doing the same thing over and 
over again and expecting different results.” He must have had the 
European Union in mind.
Bailing out one country after the other, Europe’s leaders never 
tire to claim that this last bailout, this last emergency summit, 
this last rescue mechanism will finally solve the crisis once and 
for all. And then, two weeks later, they are meeting again to proclaim 
exactly the same after another emergency round. The motto of 
Europe’s crisis management is always ‘this time is different’.
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Clearly, in the Einsteinian sense, European politicians are insane. 
They are unwilling to learn the lessons of their dilettantism because 
that would require admitting previous failures.
There is a general European unwillingness to accept criticism. 
Nothing that deviates from the EU’s own narrative about the 
inevitability of ever closer union is allowed to spoil the party. 
How else could one understand German treasurer Wolfgang 
Schäuble? Last week he seriously claimed that the euro was a ‘success 
story’ and that it had especially benefitted countries like Greece. 
In psychology, they have a term for such pathological behaviour. 
It’s called denial.
I have my very own experiences with European denialism and the 
EU’s unwillingness to take criticism. As a high school student in 
Germany, more than twenty years ago, I took part in the ‘Europe at 
School’ essay competition. Every year since 1953 students have been 
encouraged to write essays on questions of European integration.
When I submitted a critical piece on European politics one year, 
I won a small consolation prize. The next year, the topic allowed for a 
slightly more optimistic assessment and so I gained an invitation 
from the speaker of parliament to Bonn. However, when another 
year later I wholeheartedly praised the beneficial effects of the 
Single Market I was awarded with the Honorary Prize of the Federal 
Chancellor. I still have the big book prize with the handwritten 
personal dedication from Helmut Kohl on my shelves at home.
It was very obvious how the competition worked. The more you 
applauded the EU, the more the judges liked your essays. It all 
The New Zealand Initiative
 
64
had a whiff of Soviet-style indoctrination. If only I had learnt my 
lessons at school I would still be writing panegyrics on the EU today. 
But that would have meant turning a blind eye to the serious flaws of 
the EU project.
Not much has changed since my high school days, as I discovered 
last week. I had been invited to deliver a public lecture to the Centre 
for European Studies at the Australian National University, an 
institution part-funded by the EU.
The title of my speech, ‘Europe’s painful farewell’, had obviously 
made the delegation of the EU Commission in Canberra nervous. 
Perhaps they also keep a file with all my incriminating Business 
Spectator columns on Europe. In any case, two weeks before the 
event I was informed that they would send their First Counsellor 
to formally respond to my speech. It was undoubtedly an exercise 
in limiting the damage from my EU-sceptical views.
As I heard from a reliable source, the EU delegation was deeply 
concerned about the things I had to say. And so in order to neutralise 
my outrageous opinions European embassies were asked to ensure 
their diplomats attended the event as well. They did.
Apart from a handful of Australians, last Wednesday’s audience 
at ANU was a small assembly of European diplomats. They 
came from countries like France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Malta. Even Croatia, not yet part of the European Union, 
had sent a representative. The things you need to do to become an 
EU member.
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After I had finished my speech on the sad state of Europe, it 
happened as I had expected. One EU diplomat after the other 
rose to sing the praises of the EU and defend it against all 
criticisms, even those I had not made. They were so passionate 
in their speeches that I wondered whether the EU delegation had 
offered a prize for the best defence of the EU. Perhaps they could 
win a romantic dinner with either EU foreign secretary Catherine 
Ashton or EU president Herman van Rompuy?
In any case, it was telling that none of the diplomats even bothered to 
respond to my economic concerns about Europe’s debt and monetary 
crisis. Instead, one after the other began their statements with 
variations of ‘I’m not an economist but …’
And so I was informed that soon Europe would lead the world in 
green technologies, the euro was an important symbol of integration, 
and small hiccups like the debt crisis would not deter the EU 
from pursuing its integration agenda further. Their refusal to engage 
with my criticism on an economic basis was so bizarre that I’d 
rather not try to imagine how it must have sounded to the few 
Australians in the room.
A day later I received an email from one of the European embassies 
in Canberra. Writing in an apologetic tone, a senior diplomat who 
had attended the event told me that he was grateful for my views. 
Later I also spoke with another friendly European diplomat. He 
asked me not to take his colleagues’ public utterances too seriously. 
“They’re only doing their jobs; of course we all know what a 
terrible state Europe is in.”
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Everything that’s wrong with Europe, it was on display in 
Canberra last week. Economic questions are treated as political 
ones; high hopes have to pass as strategies; utopias are considered 
realities. And if you harbour any doubts about whether all of this 
makes sense you better keep them to yourself. For otherwise you 
leave the sphere of what is officially sanctioned as respectable and 
politically correct politics.
If this were only a problem for Europe, the EU’s denialism would 
be bad enough. But it isn’t. The refusal of EU elites to come to 
grips with their failures is the biggest threat to the global economy. 
The world will pay dearly for Europe’s stubborn utopianism.
Published in Business Spectator (Melbourne), 21 July 2011.
Reproduced with permission.
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THE EUROZONE MUST STOP PLAYING THE BLAME GAME
Okay, my dear Business Spectator readers. For the past five years 
I have been trying to deliver you balanced and well-researched 
columns, with the odd provocation thrown in for entertainment. 
Today, on day one after the Greek default, I just cannot do that. 
Because I am angry.
So with apologies to you and the fantastic Business Spectator editors, 
here is my Athens rant.
The past week must have been the most extraordinary yet in the 
neverending euro crisis. I just cannot recall anything like it ever 
happening before. What we have witnessed is an incredible 
combination of political dilettantism, chutzpah and aggression.
No-one in this euro game is innocent. Everyone involved has to 
take their share of the blame and acknowledge their roles in the 
escalating crisis.
To start with the original sin of the euro crisis, Greece should 
have never, ever been made a part of the eurozone. And the 
eurozone should have never happened in the first place.
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The whole idea of uniting vastly different European economies 
under one currency, one interest rate and one exchange was not 
just folly; it was madness. It had nothing to do with economics 
because it was so obviously not an optimum currency area; it was 
always just about political power.
If Germany had not needed France’s approval for re-unification 
in 1990, the Germans would have never given up their deutschemark 
voluntarily. But that was the price they had to pay for France 
accepting a bigger neighbour to the east. The French thought 
that binding Germany into the corset of a monetary union 
would curb her power. What a colossal miscalculation.
The next grave mistake was admitting Greece into the club. 
Again, this had nothing to do with economics and everything 
with symbolism. Greece, the supposed cradle of democracy, may 
have been an economic basket case for centuries. But Europe 
without Greece just did not feel right.
There was no shortage of critical voices at the time. Germany’s 
former economics minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff voted against 
letting Greece into the eurozone when the Bundestag decided 
on the matter. He warned that Greece was just not ready, but 
Lambsdorff and hundreds of economics professors writing 
petitions against the euro were just ignored.
When European Monetary Union started, the rules that were 
supposed to govern the project were never followed. They were 
barely worth the paper they were printed on. Deficit and debt 
rules, the no bailout rule, the mandate to keep the European 
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Central Bank focussed on just price stability and independent: 
When push came to shove, none of these rules mattered. The 
European Union never followed any of them. How on earth were 
they expecting anyone to develop trust in their actions, let alone 
the euro?
Various Greek governments deserve a lot of the blame for their 
country’s crisis. It was the mainstream Greek centre-left and 
centre-right parties that overspent, fiddled their statistics, found 
ingenious ways of clandestinely borrowing — all the while they 
proved themselves incapable of reforming their county. Yes, the 
current Syriza government is a disaster. But to be fair to Tsipras, 
Varoufakis & co., they inherited a mess of a country.
Other European political leaders are just as guilty of the disaster 
around Athens. Back in 2010, when it was obvious what a 
catastrophe the euro had caused in Greece, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel briefly wanted to do what is right: kick Greece out 
of the eurozone. Under pressure from other European countries 
and the US government, she quickly changed her tune. Ever 
since, the EU has been trying to fight debt with more debt.
The result of all of this is simple: The private sector managed to 
get out of Greece while all risks were transferred to European 
taxpayers. Privatise the gains, socialise the losses. Sorry if I sound 
like a socialist, but that is precisely what happened.
And what did all of this really achieve? Well, after five years 
Greece is more, not less indebted than before. Its economy has 
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shrunk by 25 percent since the peak. Its unemployment rate is 26 
percent. There is no sign of growth but growing tension between 
Greece and the rest of Europe.
The only good idea in the bailout process was to engage the 
International Monetary Fund in the packages. After all, the IMF 
has the necessary knowledge to turn around countries. However, 
led by its French directors Dominique Strauss-Kahn and 
Christine Lagarde, the IMF did not play the role of an independent 
arbitrator but that of an interested player. Greece became the 
IMF’s largest ever bailout, even though it is a small (and relatively 
rich) country.
In a world that is becoming more Asian, the IMF became more 
European. It paid too much attention to Greece and invested way 
too much money. Had it behaved in a similar way if it had not 
been about a European country? Had it done the same if it had 
not been headed by a former French politician? To ask these 
questions is to answer them.
Finally, the current Greek government. What Tsipras and Varoufakis 
have delivered in recent months must be the worst ever example 
of international diplomacy. Announce something one day 
and propose the opposite a day later. Procrastinate around 
decision-making and arrive unprepared to important meetings. 
Threaten European neighbours while asking them for help. Saying 
one thing in Athens and something completely different in Brussels. 
Charm Vladimir Putin’s Russia and call the IMF a criminal 
organisation. With no due respect, this Greek government is one 
of the worst the world has ever seen.
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Even the Greek government’s seemingly democratic idea of holding 
a referendum is pure cynicism. Its only purpose is to buy more 
time. The question on the ballot paper is unintelligible. And no 
matter what the public’s answer will be, it does not change anything 
about Greece’s position in Europe.
Don’t get me wrong: I love direct democracy and would like to 
see more of it. But rather than asking the Greeks if they want 
to have their cake and eat it, maybe we should ask the Germans 
whether they want to guarantee more Greek loans?
As I said, this is an unbalanced rant. No-one in this crisis is 
blameless: not the Greeks, not the Germans, not the European 
Commission, not the European Central Bank and least of all the 
International Monetary Fund.
There is only one hope. Now that Greece is finally and officially 
bankrupt, perhaps we might eventually see something resembling 
a solution to the crisis. How about Greece exiting the eurozone, 
devaluing its new currency, default on its debt and reform its 
economy? I have been arguing this case for five years in this column, 
and I am not the only economist who has been saying so.
Will European leaders finally listen to us?
Published in Business Spectator (Melbourne), 2 July 2015.
Reproduced with permission.
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Over the past years, we have become used to Europe’s debt crisis. 
However, the fiscal problems of countries such as Greece are only the 
tip of the iceberg. Europe’s crisis has much deeper roots.
In this essay, Dr Oliver Hartwich presents a sketch of Europe’s decline. 
The continent that invented and dominated the modern world has 
gambled away its future. Run by distant and unaccountable 
political elites, the EU embarked on a project of political integration 
for which there was never any popular appetite. At the same time, 
government spending across the continent increased to levels never 
before seen in history. To make matters worse, Europe’s population 
is ageing and shrinking.
Why Europe Failed is a sobering account of the Old World’s fall 
from grace. It also contains a warning not to repeat Europe’s 
mistakes elsewhere.
“A compelling essay”
Hon John Howard OM AC
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